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I. Introductions 
Alternative Litigation Finance—or ALF—is a rapidly growing 
largely unregulated industry, which poses myriad potential benefit 
and problems. Although ALF has attracted significant scholarly atten 
tion, the potential role for securities regulation of ALF has not beei 
widely discussed. This Essay seeks to begin that discussion by analyz 
ing the potential securities regulation of the ALF contract—which ii 
the agreement between the ALF client (the recipient of ALF funds 
and the ALF company (the supplier of ALF funds). 
This Essay proceeds in five additional parts. Part II provides ar 
overview of ALF, including a summary of the potential pros and cons 
of ALF and the various regulatory responses proposed by scholars 
Part III analyzes whether an ALF agreement satisfies the definitior 
of "investment contract" so as to qualify as a "security," concluding 
that an ALF agreement probably qualifies as a security in those 
jurisdictions that apply a vertical commonality test. Part IV analyzes 
whether ALF agreements implicate the central policy of the securities 
laws—full and fair disclosure—and concludes that ALF agreements 
are rife with information asymmetry, thus implicating this policy. 
Part V analyzes how securities regulation would affect ALF contracts, 
focusing on the prohibitions on the sale and advertising of unregis­
tered, nonexempt securities and the antifraud provisions and conclud­
ing that these provisions would partially redress the informational 
imbalances identified in Part IV. Finally, Part VI briefly concludes, 
arguing that the flexibility of securities regulation makes it a 
particularly effective method of regulating an evolving industry such 
as ALF. 
II. What Is Alternative Litigation Finance? 
Alternative Litigation Finance—or ALF—is third-party financing of 
litigation, provided outside the traditional funding sources of 
contingency-fee attorneys and insurers.1 The ALF industry is growing 
rapidly.2 Even so, demand for ALF likely exceeds supply,3 setting the 
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stage for the continued expansion of ALF. As it expands, this burton 
ing industry continues to evolve,4 with myriad potential funding strur 
tures, so any description is merely a snapshot.6 
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enough to have a realistic opportunity to achieve legal success "23 thus 
deterring "behavior that causes or allegedly causes compensable 
harms. 
At the same time, ALF poses the risk of a number of negative 
consequences. First, ALF companies are logically drawn to high-
probability suits where "underlying substantive law creates risk and 
cost imbalances that already give plaintiffs the advantage."25 The ad­
dition of ALF, which lessens the plaintiffs' remaining litigation risk 
and increases the resources available to the plaintiffs, risks "exacerbat-
[ingl existing cost and risk imbalances that favor plaintiffs."26 Second, 
the growing ALF industry may run out of high-probability suits to 
fund and turn to low-probability suits, comforted by the ability to 
diversify risk.27 As a consequence, ALF may "lead to an increase in 
speculative litigation and strike suits on the margin."28 
Finally, consumer ALF, a subset of ALF, poses unique dangers. 
First, consumer ALF is potentially predatory, "target[ing] impover­
ished plaintiffs awaiting personal injury awards with the lure of quick 
cash."29 As a consequence, absent regulation, consumer ALF can 
involve "misleading advertising, inadequate disclosure of financing 
terms, and excessive financing charges."30 Indeed, commentators have 
documented interest rates as high as 15%, compounded monthly,31 
which can result in investment returns for ALF companies as high as 
250%.32 Second, consumer ALF can distort settlements. Early in the 
litigation, consumer ALF recipients may be incentivized by the pros­
pect of compounding interest to settle the suit for less than the 
expected value,33 thus distorting the deterrent effect of liability and 
undercompensating the plaintiff. Late in the litigation, once the 
financing charges have exceeded the expected value of the suit, a 
consumer ALF recipient may reject even reasonable settlements 
because "the plaintiff has nothing to lose in going to trial in hopes of 
obtaining a recovery that leaves that person with money after repay­
ing his or her ALF supplier."34 
In light of the potentially negative consequences of ALF, commenta­
tors have called for a wide range of enhanced regulation of ALF— 
including outright prohibition,35 prohibition of ALF in personal injury 
claims,36 limits on consumer ALF fees,37 a uniform system of disclosure 
to consumers about the actual costs of ALF,38 state licensing of litiga­
tion funders,39 the adoption of a "one-way fee-shifting rule in favor of 
defendants" in cases where the plaintiff received ALF,40 the creation 
of an online marketplace of consumer ALF finance,41 and federal 
regulation by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau or the 
Federal Trade Commission.42 
Yet, the potential role for securities regulation of ALF has not been 
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and analogized ALF companies to venture capitalists.52 Indeed, one 
commercial ALF company has noted that an ALF transaction, rather 
than being structured as an ALF agreement, could be accomplished 
by buying an equity interest in the company and becoming a minority 
shareholder or by creating a separate class of equity amounting to a 
percentage of the litigation outcome.53 Therefore, ALF contracts at 
least "sound in" securities regulation, regardless of whether they 
satisfy the technical definition of "security." Of course, sounding in se­
curities regulation is not sufficient to come within the scope of the 
federal securities laws. 
Rather, in order to be subject to federal securities regulation, an 
instrument must satisfy the definition of "security." "Unless the 
context otherwise requires," the term "security" includes a laundry 
list of instruments, such as stock, notes, and the catch-all category of 
"investment contracts."54 The inclusion of investment contracts within 
the scope of the securities laws "embodies a flexible rather than a 
static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the count­
less and variable schemes by those who seek the use of the money of 
others on the promise of profits."55 The securities laws do "not stop 
with the obvious and the commonplace";56 rather, they apply equally 
to "uncommon and irregular instruments,"57 including within their 
scope "virtually any instrument that might be sold as a security."58 
The Supreme Court, in SEC u. W.J. Howey Co., defined an "invest­
ment contract" as "a contract, transaction, or scheme whereby a person 
invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits 
solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party."59 Assuming 
the investment of money (which ALF companies clearly make), there 
are three distinct elements that an ALF agreement must satisfy in or­
der to qualify as an investment contract: (1) the expectation of profits; 
(2) solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party; and (3) a 
common enterprise. ALF agreements likely satisfy the first two ele­
ments, and depending on the jurisdiction, may satisfy the third 
element. 
(a) Expectation of Profits 
ALF companies invest in litigation "in hopes of making money."60 It 
is conceivably possible that an altruistic ALF provider could be 
incentivized to "improve access to justice for financially constrained or 
risk-averse plaintiffs," but this is not the current reality.61 Indeed, one 
scholar has documented that ALF companies earn "a rate of return 
that far outstrips the average profit available in traditional invest­
ment markets such as bonds, CDs, and even the stock market."62 
Both the percentage of recovery returns earned by commercial ALF 
companies, which depend on the total recovery in the underlying 
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lawsuit," and the financing fees earned by consumer ALF companies, 
Which do not so depend," qualify as profits. Indeed the Supreme 
Court clarified in SEC u. Edwards that both variable and fixed returns 
satisfy the Howey test: "We used 'profits' in the sense of income or 
return to include, for example, dividends, other periodic payments, or 
the increased value of the investment. There is no reason to 
distinguish between promises of fixed returns and promises of vari­
able returns for purposes of the test, so understood. 
Solely From the Efforts of the Promoter or a Third (b) 
Party 
The "solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party" ele­
ment focuses on the degree of control that ALF companies exercise 
over the litigation that they fund. The circuit courts have unanimously 
declined to treat the word "solely" literally, "instead holding the 
requirement satisfied as long as 'the efforts made by those other than 
the investor are undeniably significant ones, those essential manage­
rial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise.' "66 
This interpretation prevents a wily issuer from evading the securities 
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IHor example, to protect its own interest in maximizing the fee it may 
earn, a financing company may object to steps calculated to advance the 
client s interests, such as pursuing a promising line of additional 
discovery at a cost the company would prefer to avoid, or accepting a 
settlement offer that does not meet the company's expectations regard­
ing the return on its investment.74 
Indeed, it is a significant open question' whether the contractual 
delegation of control to the ALF company—such as the control to ac­
cept or reject a settlement proposal—"is such a significant limitation 
on the lawyer's representation of the client—because it interferes 
with the lawyer's exercise of independent professional judgment—that 
the lawyer must withdraw from the representation of a client who has 
agreed to such a contract provision."75 Likely to avoid implicating 
these ethical issues, many ALF suppliers expressly disclaim any 
control over the litigation in the ALF agreements.76 Indeed, some ALF 
companies even go so far as to describe themselves as "passive."77 In 
addition, in the context of consumer ALF, the relatively small size of 
each individual lawsuit makes the exercise of control by the ALF 
company economically unfeasible, except perhaps in the context of 
settlement negotiations.78 
In sum, despite incentives to do so, most ALF companies currently 
do not exercise significant control over the litigation, likely out of fear 
of forcing the plaintiffs attorney to withdraw from the representation. 
Therefore, in the current market, the efforts of the plaintiffs attorney, 
as the agent of the plaintiff, are the "undeniably significant ones."79 
Finally, the plaintiffs attorney's efforts qualify as "essential mana­
gerial efforts."80 Several courts have distinguished between manage­
rial efforts and ministerial efforts, holding that if an investment's 
profitability depends merely on the exercise of ministerial efforts "of 
the promoter or a third party," the investment does not qualify as an 
investment contract, regardless of who exercises those ministerial 
efforts. For example, where the seller of silver bars retained posses­
sion of the bars, but "the profits of the investor depended upon the 
fluctuations of the silver market," the sales of the silver bars were not 
investment contracts.81 Similarly, where the promoter of investments 
in viatical settlements retained record ownership of the settlements, 
but the investor's rate of return depended almost exclusively on "how 
long the insured survives," the investments were not investment 
contracts.82 In the context of ALF, one could argue that the ALF 
company's profits, to be paid from any proceeds of the suit, depend on 
the application of the substantive law to the underlying merits of the 
suit and that the plaintiffs attorney's role should be characterized as 
ministerial. In reality, however, the plaintiffs attorney's judgment 
and skill undoubtedly affect the outcome of litigation, as evidenced by 
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the ALF company will recover but the plaintiff will get nothing.89 This 
narrow potential exception to the relationship between the recoveries 
of the plaintiff and the ALF company probably does not prevent a 
finding of narrow vertical commonality. 
(d) Unless the Context Otherwise Requires 
In sum ALF agreements likely satisfy the "expectation of profit" 
and solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party" elements 
of the Howey test. With respect to the "common enterprise" element, 
ALF agreements do not satisfy the horizontal commonality test and 
probably satisfy both the broad and the narrow vertical commonality 
tests. Therefore, whether ALF agreements satisfy the Howey test 
depends on the jurisdiction. 
Separate and apart from the Howey test, however, an instrument 
qualifying as an investment contract is treated as a security "unless 
the context otherwise requires."90 This contextual inquiry centers on 
whether the instrument needs the protection of the securities laws.91 
In other words, the question of 'what is a security' is in many ways 
the same as asking; should we apply securities regulation here?"92 
Indeed, in Marine Bank v. Weaver, even though the subject agreement 
arguably satisfied the Howey test, the Supreme Court declined to 
treat it as a security, citing its uniqueness (including the right to us­
age of a barn as one of its terms) and the fact that it was negotiated 
one-on-one by the parties.93 Therefore, this Essay turns now to the 
question of whether ALF implicates the policies underlying securities 
regulation. 
IV. Does Alternative Litigation Finance Implicate the Poli­
cies Underlying Securities Regulation? 
The essence of the securities laws is disclosure. The Supreme Court 
has often stated that the federal securities laws are designed to ensure 
full and fair disclosure to investors.94 For example, in Tcherepnin v. 
Knight, the Court explained: "The Securities Exchange Act quite 
clearly falls within the category of remedial legislation. One of its 
central purposes is to protect investors through the requirement of 
full disclosure by issuers of securities . . . ,"95 As translated to the 
context of ALF, this policy focuses on whether there is an information 
imbalance such that ALF companies need the securities laws to ensure 
that they receive full and fair disclosure about their investments. 
Sometimes, however, the Supreme Court has stated the purpose of 
the securities laws more broadly, arguably widening the policy to 
include an interest in ensuring full and fair disclosure to all parties to 
a transaction, not only to investors.96 As applied to ALF, this broader 
policy potentially brings the information interests of ALF clients 
within its scope. As discussed below, both ALF companies and ALF 
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ALF suppliers by taking such actions as misrepresenting the strengths 
of their legal claims in efforts to benefit financially. Such opportunistic 
actions, which may not be detectable by ALF suppliers, are examples of 
the well-known general problem called moral hazard,108 
In fact, some commentators have even called for regulation requiring 
"claimants to provide financiers full disclosure."109 
As an example of alleged misrepresentations to an ALF company, 
the CEO and co-founder of Burford Capital LLC, a commercial ALF 
company, recently filed a declaration claiming that Burford was 
fraudulently induced into investing in the Ecuadorian Lago Agrio Lit­
igation against Chevron Corporation.110 Even though Burford 
conducted "months of due diligence and negotiation" and the "Fund­
ing Agreement included specific representations, including that none 
of the plaintiffs or any of their lawyers knew anything 'reasonably 
likely to be material to the Funder's assessment of the Claim that has 
not been disclosed to the Funder,' "111 Burford now claims that it was 
deceived about important components of the litigation, including the 
alleged "ghostwriting" of a key plaintiffs' expert's report.112 Of note, 
the plaintiffs and their attorneys dispute Burford's claims and attri­
bute various motives to its current allegations, including fear of "be­
ing blackballed by its target market following unanticipated public 
disclosure of Burford's support of mass-tort plaintiffs."113 Regardless of 
the merits of Burford's allegations, they demonstrate the potential for 
fraud in this industry. 
An ALF company can protect itself to a certain degree by negotiat­
ing for the inclusion of penalty provisions in the ALF agreement114 
and for staged financing based on the achievement of milestones.115 
Once the ALF company's funds are disbursed, however, an ALF 
company's right to sue for breach of the ALF agreement or right to 
withhold future stages of funding may be of cold comfort. In short, 
therefore, the securities laws' policy interest in ensuring full and fair 
disclosure to investors is implicated in the context of ALF. 
To the extent that the securities laws are concerned with full and 
fair disclosure to all parties to a transaction, rather than merely to 
investors, this policy is also implicated from the perspective of the 
consumer ALF client. As discussed above, consumer ALF has the 
potential to be predatory. Information asymmetries between the par­
ties about the content of the ALF agreement exacerbate that potential. 
Consumer ALF clients are often vulnerable,116 possessing unequal 
bargaining power,117 and they "do not receive any precise information 
regarding interest rates, fees, and repayment schedules until their 
cases are approved for financing."118 As such, they may enter into ALF 
agreements without understanding their terms. For example, in re­
sponse to this problem, the New York Attorney General announced an 
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probably exempt from registration under § 4(a)(2) of the Securities 
Act and Kule 506 promulgated thereunder. Section 4(a)(2) exempts 
from registration "transactions by an issuer not involving a public 
offering. As interpreted by case law, this exemption requires that 
1) the offerees have access to the types of information that would be 
contained in a full-fledged 1933 Act registration statement," and (2) 
the offerees be sufficiently sophisticated to demand and understand 
the information that is available to them."126 An ALF agreement likely 
satisfies this agreement because the ALF company has the ability to 
engage in at least some due diligence and because the ALF company 
dS ianrI^Sit27tUtiOIial investor' is probably sufficiently sophisticated.' 
Rule 506, a safe harbor under § 4(a)(2), contains a laundry list of 
l equirements, the most stringent of which (the requirements to dis­
close specific information128 and to verify the investor's knowledge and 
experience129) are inapplicable to accredited investors. In the current 
market, ALF companies likely qualify as accredited investors under 
Kule 501(a)(8) because their owners are likewise accredited,130 either 
as natural persons131 or as other entities owned by accredited owners.132 
As the ALF industry evolves to include non-accredited investors 
without access to detailed information about ALF clients, however, 
these exemptions from registration may no longer be available. 
Second, assuming for purposes of analysis that ALF agreements are 
not exempt from registration, the current ALF industry doubly 
violates § 5. First, ALF agreements are not typically registered with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission before sale, thus violating 
§ 5(a)(1). Second, ALF companies routinely advertise their willingness 
to enter into ALF agreements,133 effectively "offering to buy" unregis­
tered ALF agreements, in arguable violation of § 5(c). 
Finally, assuming that the current operation of the ALF industry 
violates § 5, the ALF client does not have the right to rescission, and 
the ALF company may be barred from seeking rescission by the in 
pari delicto defense; as such, enforcement of § 5 will likely depend on 
SEC involvement. Section 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act provides the 
"purchaser" of a security offered or sold in violation of § 5 a right to 
rescission.134 By statute, therefore, the rescission right resides in the 
purchaser alone—here, the ALF company. Consistent with the Anglo-
Dutch Petroleum court's interpretation of a comparable provision 
under Texas securities law,135 § 12(a)(1) does not provide the issuer— 
here, the ALF client—the right to rescission. The right to rescission 
under § 12(a)(1) is further limited, however, to purchasers who are 
not in pari delicto,136 As the Supreme Court has interpreted the in 
pari delicto defense in this context, a purchaser is barred from rescind­
ing the purchase of an unregistered security where (1) the purchaser 
is "at least equally responsible for the actions that render the sale of 
©2014 Thomson Reuters • Securities Regulation Law Journal • Spring 2014 17 
SECURITIES REGULATION LAW , 
the unregistered securities illegal"- and (2) th 
offering or sale of nonexemntod ' ,(2) 'he purchaser's «ml« • 
promoter than as *d securities" J."' 
rently operates tho att? ' least as the AT TP • j ^ 
for the Cs ofthe A^ fl'0mPan,eS.are at W ! 
Agister it and «. ^eement, including the dnmo- ®P°nsili 
offering "i"/ often involved in thn Cu ecisi0n whether 
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unregistered securities, the potential for SEC involvement may be the 
most meaningful effect of the securities regulation of ALF. 
VI. Conclusion 
A T T̂ 6AL̂  indu®try 1S complex, featuring commercial and consumer 
ALF, and its future evolution is uncertain.147 As such, flexible regula­
tion is imperative. Securities regulation, whose gap-filling role this 
author has previously noted,140 might be the appropriate tool to 
regulate the ALF industry, at least until such time as the industry 
stabilizes. 
Indeed, this essay concludes that ALF agreements—which are 
entered into by ALF clients and ALF companies—arguably satisfy the 
definition of "investment contract," thus qualifying as "securities" for 
purposes of the federal securities laws. In addition, ALF agreements, 
which the parties enter into with unequal information and which pose 
the resultant risk of fraud, implicate the securities laws' central policy 
of full and fair disclosure. Finally, the application of the securities 
laws to ALF agreements, including the restrictions on the sale and 
advertising of unregistered, nonexempt securities and the antifraud 
provisions, would arguably redress the problem of informational asym­
metry that ALF agreements pose. 
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